Stoke Vs Norwich: Exploiting a chaotic defence.

NCFC Analysis
7 min readMar 20, 2024

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Score: 0–3

Possession (%): 45–55

Passes: 418–527

Shots: 10–16

xG: 0.94–2.18

  • Stoke’s man-oriented press.
  • Moments of defensive disorganisation.
  • Norwich’s verticality and transitions.
  • Second half changes.

Base Formations:

On the back of an impressive ascendance into the play-off places and a convincing win against Rotherham, Norwich made the trip to the Potteries to face Steven Schumacher’s relegation-battling Stoke City.

David Wagner named an unchanged eleven, while Schumacher made one enforced change, with Ben Pearson replacing the suspended Wouter Burger in what was a significant loss for the hosts. Norwich set up in their usual 4–2–3–1 base formation, while Stoke lined up in a 3–4–2–1 shape.

In Norwich’s deepest build-up phases, their rotations began from a fluid 4–2–2–2 structure. Sara (17) and Barnes (10) often dropped ahead of City’s double pivot, while Sainz (7) tended to start higher on the left.

From Stoke’s 3–4–2–1 base, Laurent (28) stepped inside to occupy Norwich’s left-sided pivot, while Jun-Ho (22) typically pressed from the front. This created a situational front two ahead of Laurent (28).

Rather than transitioning into a zonally organised pressing structure, Stoke pressed with man-orientation: where pressing players’ positions are determined by the positions of opposing players.

This meant the hosts frequently created man-to-man pressing situations, leaving only the goalkeeper free when Wagner’s side played out from the back.

With Laurent (28) occupying McLean (23), and Stoke’s situational front two pressing the centre-backs, Baker (8) was often forced to cover a large distance when jumping to press Nunez (26). In the wide areas, the host’s wing-backs were ready to press Stacey (3) and McCallum (15).

With Sara (17), Barnes (10), and Sainz (7) often dropping deep, at least one of Stoke’s centre-backs jumped into midfield alongside Pearson (4) to prevent an overload behind the first two lines of pressure.

When Norwich were building on their right, for example, Wilmot (16) jumped into the visitor’s half to occupy Sara (17), while Pearson (4) stayed tight to Barnes (10), and Hoever (17) followed Sainz (7) infield.

Replacing the injured Ben Pearson (4) part-way through the first half, Thompson (15) took Baker’s (8) advanced pressing role while the number eight dropped into the position vacated by Pearson (4).

By temporarily switching positions, however, Sara (17) and Nunez (26) disorganised the host’s press. Instead of jumping from Nunez (26) to Sara (17), Thompson (15) continued to track the former, leaving the latter free behind the first line of pressure.

Once Stacey (3) overlapped on the right, Thompson (15) dropped even deeper, leaving Gooch (2) in a 2v1 against Nunez (26) and Sara (17). Therein lie the key weaknesses of man-to-man pressing systems: they rely on individuals making the right decisions and winning 1v1 duels, while they can also be manipulated by positional rotations.

Given the chaos that ensued for much of the first half, it’s worth digressing from a breakdown of interacting structures to focus on the tactics behind individual moments of disorganisation.

In the build-up to Norwich’s opening goal, for instance, Stoke’s players managed to combine sitting too deep and pushing too high during their own throw-in. With Gooch (2) taking the set-piece, Wilmot (16) was positioned too deep to provide an option for the host’s left-back. Instead, Gooch (2) played into Norwich’s 4v3 overload.

Once Barnes (10) regained possession and combined with Sara (17) and McLean (23) to escape in transition, Wilmot’s (16) depth meant he was unable to counter-press, therefore allowing McLean (23) time to advance towards the Stoke half.

With Hoever (17) occupying space high on the right, he was too far away to track Sainz (7). This, combined with poor defensive positioning from McNally (23) and weak 1v1 defending from Rose (5), meant Sargent (9) and Sainz (7) were free to run onto a through ball from McLean (23).

In settled possession, Norwich created a fluid 3-diamond-3 structure when McLean (23) or Nunez (26) dropped into a situational back three and the full-backs advanced on both sides.

In response, Stoke created a man-oriented 5–2–1–2 mid-press, with Laurent (28) tracking Norwich’s single pivot. But the host’s front two failed to shadow-mark City’s pivot, and Laurent (28) often allowed a pass between the lines.

Behind the initial lines of pressure, Sainz (7), Barnes (10), and Sara (17) created a 3v2 against the host’s double pivot. As a result, when one of Norwich’s inverted wingers dropped to receive, the nearest Stoke midfielder followed while a centre-back jumped to occupy Barnes (10).

Wagner’s men identified this as the moment to manipulate Stoke’s press. On the visitor’s right, for example, Sara (17) moved into the space behind Wilmot (16), thereby dragging Gooch (2) away from Stacey (3) who received a diagonal pass from McLean (23).

Norwich manipulated Stoke’s press in similar fashion on the opposite side, including in the build-up to their second goal.

This time it was Stoke’s wing-back who followed Sainz (7) when he dropped deep into Norwich’s half, leaving Rose (5) to follow McCallum (15) as he cut inside to receive. McCallum (15) then found McLean (23) who played a bounce pass into space behind Stoke’s right wing-back.

With Stoke goalkeeper Daniel Iverson (1) going long at nearly every opportunity — achieving only 4 accurate long balls in 27 attempts — The Potters only moments of controlled build-up came on the edge of their own half, where they created a 3–2–4–1 settled-play structure.

In these phases, Norwich transitioned between a 4–4–2 mid-block and a 4–1–3–2 mid-press when Nunez (26) moved ahead of McLean (23).

When Sainz (7) pressed from the front, Nunez (26) was quick to close down the right-side pivot to prevent him from turning to access the space on either side of McLean (23).

In the last line, Norwich did well to occupy every Stoke player on the ball-side as Gibson (6) tracked Laurent (28), and McCallum (15) stayed tight to Hoever (17). In response, Stoke were forced to play hopeful passes over City’s high defensive line.

In the second half, Wilmot (16) was replaced by Manhoef (42) as Schumacher switched to a back four, with his side often pressing man-to-man from a 4–4–2 shape.

Typically, Baker (8) joined Campbell (10) in a front two, while Laurent (28) and Thompson (15) tracked Norwich’s double pivot. This left a 4v4 in the last line, where Gooch (2) and McNally (23) jumped onto Sara (17) and Barnes (10), respectively.

Although Stoke improved in the second half, they continued to rely on winning individual duels — a reliance that resulted in moments of chaos in the first half.

While these moments were undoubtedly created by the host’s shortcomings, it must be recognised that they were aggravated by Norwich’s manipulative positional rotations and coordinated patterns of play.

In possession, Stoke offered very little. Their direct approach only relinquished the possibility of controlled progression, and the chaotic execution of Schumacher’s press played right into Norwich’s hands, with Wagner’s side excelling in transitional attacks.

Aside from those caveats, however, this was undeniably yet another significant and convincing win in Norwich’s late push for the play-offs.

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NCFC Analysis

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